Iʿtibār is consideration of a thing under a particular aspect. In a metaphysical register, iʿtibārī marks what exists only in and through the considering intellect.
In ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s Works
Purposive practical positing
In the reviewed Uṣūl treatment of practical iʿtibāriyyāt, ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī uses iʿtibār for a purposive positing: a relation is adopted in view of an end, and assessed by whether it is futile relative to that end. This practical use is not interchangeable with the ontological contrast between original and derivative aspects.
Source: Uṣūl-i Falsafah wa Rawish-i Riʾālism
Derivative notionality
Nihāyat al-Ḥikmah
notional — key distinction
The notional aspect is distinguished from the original aspect to which reality belongs in itself.
Limits of this account
It does not describe practical or legal convention in Uṣūl’s special sense.
Posited propositions and practical views
In al-Manāmāt, ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī deploys iʿtibār at proposition and practical-judgment levels: posited propositions are assessed by accord with an order, and posited views guide human action. Qaḍāyā and ārāʾ remain distinct deployments and are not synonyms for umūr, matters or entities.
Source: Risālat al-Manāmāt wa-l-Nubuwwāt
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