Chapter Thirteen — On the State of the Soul in its Visions, and the Discussion of Dreams

We say: it is known that the soul, during the vision/dream (al-ruʾyā), is not occupied with everything with which it was occupied in waking, so a space is, in general, cleared for it; and in the measure of its returning to its own world, something of its world appears to it. This meaning — I mean that sleep lies, in general, beyond the phase of materiality and its order — is granted by all human beings, since these dreams that report plainly of hidden matters and future events, or [report them] by suitability and resemblance — no one is able to deny them.

Then we say: it has passed in the foregoing principles that the imagination (al-khayāl) represents the form of that upon which it represents by the suitable meanings and matters present to it — whether by a presence that is coincidental, or customary, or natural. It has also passed that nature and temperament (al-mizāj) have a great share in supplying a form suited to themselves — as, for example, the feverish person necessarily imagines fire on account of the heat he has, and [imagines] cold on account of the recovery and revival he has. And it has also passed that the soul, upon its return to its imaginal world, looks upon the imaginal connections that are in the interior of the world of sense.

By these three principles most of what sleep contains of secret and reality is accomplished. So during sleep, if temperament (al-mizāj) or some coercive factor prevails — giving the sleeper an image, such as indigestion, or repletion, or a dominant image [present] before the time of sleep, or a strong occurrence coming upon the outward senses, especially the sense of touch, like a sting, an itch, a strong heat or cold, or some other incoming thing that affects the sense so intensely that it reaches the soul. Then there comes upon the soul an image suited to that. So it sees, for example, a bath, or snow, or rain, or the like, or it mixes it with what it sees of the vision/dream (al-ruʾyā); and sometimes it sees dreadful, terrifying things. In a vision of this sort, interpretation (al-taʿbīr) has no place. But if none of these matters has preceded, the soul plunges into its imaginal world and sees what it sees.

Then we say: and at that point it may represent it by what is generically suitable, and it may take the very thing seen. So if it represents it by what is generically suitable, or by what is suitable in its own view through a personal habit or a coincidental suitability, then the vision/dream (al-ruʾyā) stands in need of interpretation (al-taʿbīr) — which is the passage from one suitable [thing] to another until one halts upon the witnessed origin. Thus a person may see elevation as sky, or a minaret, or a horse; and glory as sovereignty, a crown, or the like. He may see the enemy as a snake, a dog, or some other menace, and see everything feared and forbidding in the form of his enemy; and it may pass from an opposite to an opposite just as it passes from a like to a like — so from health to sickness, and from life to death. All this is when it halts after two or three [steps]. But if it goes on in a chain from one suitable [thing] to another, or an opposite, and so on, then halting upon the origin becomes impossible. This kind is called confused dreams (aḍghāth al-aḥlām); it is not interpreted, and it occurs mostly in the cunning, deceitful person, or the disputatious one whose mind passes from one suitable [thing] to another, or to a contrary — all of this together with representation (al-ḥikāya). But in the absence of it [representation], sleep does not need interpretation; rather it is the very thing that appeared there, and this occurs mostly in one whose mind is free of manipulation and in the person of strong memory.

For this reason it has been said: truthfulness makes the vision/dream truthful — this being because the truthful person does not tamper with what he sees and attains, but rather preserves it as it is and in its [proper] form. So it has become clear that sleep is of four kinds: The first: that whose cause is temperament (al-mizāj) or the like, and it has no interpretation (taʿbīr). The second: confused dreams (aḍghāth al-aḥlām), and these too have no interpretation — but the absence of interpretation in them is due to the impossibility of reaching [the origin], whereas in the first kind it is due to the nullity of the vision. The third: the veridical dream that is not tampered with, and it too has no interpretation, on account of there being no need. The fourth: the dream that has been worked over by representation (al-ḥikāya), and this kind alone stands in need of interpretation, because the soul has tampered with it by representing what it attained in another form.

Let it be known that the original thing seen may be particular, and may be universal, and the state of interpretation (al-taʿbīr) differs according to their difference. So it is incumbent upon the interpreter to keep in view the disposition of the dreamer regarding his aim, his purpose, his occupation, his condition, his habits, his thoughts at the time of his sleep, his truthfulness, his character, and his temperament (al-mizāj) — in short, everything that has a bearing on the vision/dream (al-ruʾyā) — and then he judges by what he wills and what appears to him. And let it be known and heeded that sleep may prevail and turn the soul toward it, and, according to what appears, necessitate a will toward outward acts, such as sitting up, speaking, fleeing, nocturnal emission, and the like. Its cause has already passed, and temperament has a great share in this matter.